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Following submi.ssion on 12 June by the Commission of _the Communities 
to the Committee on Budgets of its proposals on the strengthening of the 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament (Doc. 1000), the Committee on 
Budgets decided to present an interim report to Parliament on the matter. 
By letter of 22 June 1973 the Committee on Budgets requested author-
ization to do so and asked that the item be included on the agenda for the 
July part-session. 
By its decision of 25 June, the Bureau entered this report on the 
draft agenda for the July part-session. 
At its meeting of 21 June, the committee confirmed the nomination of 
Mr Spenale, chairman of the committee, as rapporteur. 
The Committee on Budgets and the Political Affairs Committee held a 
joint meeting to discuss the matter on 22 June 1973. 
The report was discussed by the Committee on Budgets on 21 and 29 June. 
The unanimous vote on the motion for a resolution of 21 June was confirmed, 
likewise unanimously, on 29 June. 
The following were present: Mr Spenale, chairman and rapporteur, 
Mr Artzinger, Mr Boano Mr Fabbrini, Mr Glesener (deputizing for 
Mr Kollwelter), Mr Memmel Mr MUller, Mr Notenboon, Mr Pounder, 
Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams and Mr Wohlfart. 
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The Committee on Budgets hereby submits to the European Parliament the 
foll,,...-ing ,notion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the proposals from the Commission of the European communities on the 
st:..-e1,gthening of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposals submitted by the commission to the council 
on l~ June 1973 (COM(73)1000), 
- having regard to the declarations made by the Commission and the council 
of the Communities on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of 22 
April 1970 am1mding certain budgetary provisions of the Treaties of Rome 
and Paria and annexed to that Treaty, 
- havi~~ regard to the ratification of the said Treaty by the Parliaments of 
the 1'!.embe.l'.' States and to the debates which took place in connection there-
wi t:h. 
- recalling its resolutions of 10 December 1969, 3 February, 11 March, 13 May, 
1970, 5 July and 12 December 1972. 1 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (Doc.131/73), 
A. PRtNf::IPLES 
1. reaffirms its basic and firm position to the effect that, at a time 
1 
when the expenditure of the Communities is to be entirely financed by the 
Communities' own resources and the national parliaments are losing all 
direct power in respect of this revenue and expenditure, the European Par-
liament must be given r~al powers of decision and control over the formu-
lation, adoption and implementation of the community pudget so that the 
overaJ 1 ri_ghts of parliamentary democracy in the community and in the 
Membe1 States are not diminished in an unacceptable manner. 
OJ No. C 2,8.1.1970,p.13 
OJ No. C 25, 28.2.1970, p.27 
OJ No. C 40,3.4.1970,p.23 
OJ No. C 65, 5.6.1970,p.32 
OJ No. C 82,26.7.1972,p.29 
OJ No. C 138,31.12.1972,p.32 
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B. ST.M;:·;,__ '.)l' THE PROCEDURE 
2. ~es~ets that the proposals which the Commission was to submit at the 
l;;.·.:..=,;·:. in 1972 on an increase in the budgetary powers of the European 
P~rl:.i.,n.ent were not in fact presented until 12 June 1973 and that time is 
now vt:,::y .a'hort to complete all the essential procedures - in particular 
r,-..tification by the Member States - before the budget of the Conununities is 
prepared for 1975; 
3. Thezefore calls upon the Commission and Council of the Communities to 
give the utmost priority to consideration of the provisions to increase the 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament. 
C. SUBSTANCE 
a) Financial_indeeendence_of_the_communities 
4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission has proposed, in confirmity with 
the opinion of Parliament, that additional own resources may be introduced 
by Community procedures requiring unanimity in the Council and a decision of 
Parliament taken by an absolute majority of its Members and three-fifths of 
the votes cast; 
5. Strongly urges, however, that Parliament itself as the representative 
of the peoples of the Community, should, in the final instance, 'adopt' the 
decision; 
6. Keenly regrets that the Commission has not itself adhered to its previous 
interpretation to tte effect that the Treaty of April 1970 enables Parliament 
to reject the budget outright at the final stage of the procedure, to enable 
the Council to formulate new proposals; 
7. Recalls that this interpretation had been unanimously adopted by the 
European Parliament and was considered by it to be the only real, and there-
fore essential, power in respect of the principal budget funds; 
8. Therefore expresses, in the firmest terms, its desire for the commission 
to reaffirm its position on this point and to propose a corresponding addition 
to Article 203 of the EEC treaty to rule out any ambiguity in interpretation; 
9. Conside~~ chat where major rule-making decisions with significant budgetary 
implica·cions are concerned, the second reading procedure proposed by the com-
mission is inadequate. 
lu. Believes that the European Parliament should have the final say as regards 
t~e financial implications of any new measures. 
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ii .. Calls upon the Commission to examine the matter in this light and to 
formulate appropriate new propo1ala1 
(c) Power• and mean• of control 
---------------------------
12. Welcomes the proposal to the effect that the Parliament, acting on a recom-
mendation of the Council, will in future give a sole discharge in respect of 
the budget; 
13. Welcomes, subject to certain provisions of detail, the•principle of the 
establishment of an Audit Office of the European communities; 
-o-0-0-0-o-o-o-o-o-o 
CONCLUSION 
14. Reaffirms that it cannot endorse any proposal which does not, in general 
terms, give real budgetary power to the representatives of the peoples of 
the Community; 
15. Accordingly requests the Conunission of the Conununities to take account 
of this resolution and to continue its examination of this matter with its 
appropriate conunittees to enable a far-reaching debate to be held and posit-
ive conclusions reached at the September part-session. 
16. Instructs its president to forward this resolution and the report of 
its committee to the Council and Commission of the communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
B 
EXPIANATORY STATEMENT 
1. In the presence of a representative of the Political Affairs Conunittee, 
the Conunittee on Budgets officially received on 12 June 1973, the proposals 
from the Commission of the European Conununities on the 'strengthening of the 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament'. 
Consideration of these proposals is extremely urgent if they are to be 
effectively applied to the preparation of the 1975 budget, work on which will 
begin in July 1974, i.e. in twelve months'' time; this time limit already appears 
very short to complete the necessary procedures involving,essentially, modif-
ications to the Treaties which will in turn re~uire ratification by the nine 
Parliaments of the Member States. 
2. It is therefore important for Parliament, and its Conunittee on Budgets 
and Political Affairs Conunittee, to bear in mind the need for the procedures 
to be speeded up as far as possible. 
3. We are concerned here with an essential stage in the adaptation of the 
institutional equilibrium of the Conununities and while, in May 1970, Parliament 
decided not to oppose ratification of the Luxembourg agreements of April 1970 
since new proposals were to be submitted before implementation of the provis-
ions scheduled to take effect in the normal period (i.e. from 1 January 1975), 
we are now obliged to note: 
a) that the provisions to be adopted on this occasion will be effectively 
applicable as soon as preparation of the 1975 budget begins; 
b) that it will be very difficult to review these provisions subsequently 
at an early date. 
It is therefore essential for the new proposals to be examined closely, 
with very great attention to detail. 
4. Bearing this requirement in mind and the late date on which the 
Conunission's proposals were submitted, it will be impossible to hold a full 
and exhaustive debate at the July part-session of Parliament. 
On the other hand, having regard to the urgency of the discussions which 
will need to be arranged, it appears essential to hold a general, information-
al debate at least. 
Essentially, the Conunission's att~ntion should be drawn to the following: 
1) the main lines on which Parliament can signify its agreement to the 
proposals; 
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2) the points on which Parliament disagreesi 
3) the minimum proposals required from the Commission, failing which 
Parliament would be obliged to reject these proposals outright and 
perhaps draw other consequences. 
This report is a first approach to an outline of the grounds for 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction. 
I. GROUNDS FOR SATISFACTION 
Communiti ~rocedure_for_the_creation_of_new_own_resources 
5. In substance, the Commission has taken over the Rey Commission's propos-
als on the financial independence of the Communities. It proposes that new 
own resources should be decided by Community procedures to meet the require-
ments of the common policies. 
Article 201 of the EEC Treaty would have to be amended and replaced by 
the following provisions: 
'The Commission shall examine in what manner the Community's own 
resources could be raised either from the fiscal revenue of the 
Member States, particularly revenue accruing from harmonized taxes, 
or from direct or indirect taxes introduced for the benefit of the 
Community. 
In every fifth year the Council, after receiving a report from the 
Commission and consulting the Assembly, shall examine whether and 
in what manner new resources should be introduced for the Community. 
The Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and by agree-
ment with the Assembly, may make provision for new resources for 
the Community or amend the assessment basis for the Community's 
existing resources. The Council shall act unanimously and the 
Assembly by a majority of its members and of three fifths of the 
votes cast.' 1 
6. This text, which is in principle satisfactory, calls for a number of 
commentsi the first concerns the idea that the 'basis of assessment' of 
existing own resources may be modified to obtain new own resources. This 
proposal appears dangerous when we consider the present nature of the 
Community's own resources which involve either international trade (customs 
duties) or economic activities and consumption in the Member States (value 
added tax). 
It is difficult to see how the basis of assessment could be changed 
in such areas for Community requirements without generating consequences 
for the Communities' trade relations or in the Member States' production 
and consumption circuits. 
It would be preferable to adopt the rates of existing, harmonized taxes. 
1 Part 3, page 4 of Doc. COM(73) 1000 
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7. The idea of a regular and systematic examination of the creation of new 
own resources appears less dangerous but equally undesirable. In fact, the 
proposed intervals are disturbing for two quite different reasons: 
a) there is a risk of having to wait for three, four or five years for the 
budgetary resources essential to meet unanimously recognized and urgent 
requirements; 
b) conversely, there would be a temptation to create, at the five yearly 
intervals, resources which are not indispensable, if only to counter the 
risk referred to above. 
To sum up, it may be impossible to act when action is necessary 
although measures may be taken as a precaution when they are not indis-
pensable. 
These risks appear still more serious when we consider that one, 
two or more financial years are needed for the Member States to take 
account - on the revenue and expenditure sides - of changes which may 
result from Community decisions. 
Audit Office and discharge 
8. The Commission proposes that a discharge in respect of the budget 
be given in future by the Assembly on a recommendation of the Council. 
This proposal is satisfactory provided that a definition is given 
of a 'Council recommendation' and an indication provided as to whether 
such a recommendation would be binding. 
It is important for all ambiguity in this matter to be ruled out. 
9. To enable the European Parliament to exercise its controlling res-
ponsibilities in an appropriate manner, the Commission proposes that 
external control in the Communities should be entrusted to a European 
Audit Office. 
This proposal accords with the ideas of the Committee on Budgets, 
following its two meetings with the Chairmen of the Audit Offices of the 
nine Member States of the Community. However, it warrants a detailed 
examination which is not possible in the limited framework of this 
initial guidance report. 
10. The agreement of the Assembly is stipulated for loans which may be 
contracted by the Communities. 
11. The ECSC levy is to be fixed by the High Authority after the Assembly 
has given its approval. This is certainly an improvement on the present 
procedure under which only certain parliamentary committees were consulted 
on the rate of the levy. 
II. GROUNDS FOR DISSATISFACTION 
12. Although it is clear that to some extent the reality of budgetary 
powers is conditioned by the effective possibility of controlling implement-
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ation of the budge.t on the revenue and expenditure sides, it is clear that 
the essential feature of budgetary powers resides in the Parliament's real 
influence on decisions which determine the major sums appearing in the 
budget and on the preparation of the annual budget. 
In this essential area, the Commission's proposals are much less satis-
factory and it seems that the importance attributed to controlling activities 
has the effect - perhaps unintentional - of concealing to some extent the far 
less substantial content of the Commission's proposals in this vital sector. 
13. In this respect, it was natural to expect on this occasion proposals 
going beyond those submitted by the Commission in April.1970. In fact, however, 
the opposite is the case. 
The Commission makes no me.ntion of the possibility for Parliament to 
reject outright the draft budget at the end of the procedure in order to 
elicit new proposals from the Council. It seems that, 
bearing in mind the divergent interpretations of the governments whose dele-
gations make up the Ccuncil, it would have been necessary to propose the 
insertion of a new fourth paragraph in Article 203(5), reading substantially 
as follows: 
'Art. 203(5), fourth para. 
The Assembly, acting by a majority of one half plus one of its 
members and two thirds of the votes cast, may reject outright 
the draft budget in order to enable the Council to formulate 
new proposals.' 
The Commission would surely endorse this provision, unless it has now 
departed from the interpretation to which it subscribed with the Parliament 
in April 1970. 
14. The Commission also indicated that it has 
'suggested a 'second reading' procedure for important rule-making 
decisions of general application (Doc. COM/73/570 Final of 19.4.73, 
sec. IV-B-I). The latter procedure should therefore be applied in 
the case of all decisions of principle having considerable financial 
effects over a period covered by several budgets. If, for example, 
new, permanent machinery for financial intervention were to be set 
up tomorrow, a second reading would have to be arranged each time 
the Council wished to depart markedly from the opinion given by the 
Parliament upon the first reading. Naturally the Commission undertakes 
to re-examine its own position each time the second reading pro-
cedure is applied'. 1 
1 doc. COM 1000, p. 4. 
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·. 
we believe that this procedure could only lend real force to the Par-
liament's position if a definition were given of the areas and conditions 
(quorum etc.) in which the Parliament's stqndpoint would have a binding 
force, in other words of the areas in which and conditions under which it may 
have the final say. 
This would of course entail a corres,ponding modification of the Treaty 
and it appears that the Commission's primary concern has in fact been to do 
nothing which might entail such a modification. The Commission states that 
'without any modification of the general pattern of European con-
struction, Parliament would thus be sure of being associated with 
the preparation of decisions determining the major annual budget 
items and, above all, those reflecting Community policies. Par-
liament will thus be sure of being in a position to express its 
opinion publicly on all those policies.' 1 
It is unfortunately evident that Parliament already had the possibility 
of expressing its opinion publicly on all these policies. The only thing it 
lacked was the binding force which should attach to its deliberations. 
As to the second reading in itself, it adds little to the present prac-
tices since, in the areas concerned, there is already a procedure for contacts 
between the Parliament and Council which must in particular explain after the 
event the reasons for which it may have departed from the decisions of the 
Assembly. 
15. Here too there is no essential change in the Parliament's powers, since 
the budgetary amounts on which it is to pronounce subsequently will be entirely 
conditioned by decisions taken at a higher.level. 
16. The rapporteur had suggested that as far as decisions with budgetary 
implications were concerned, the possibil~ty should be considered of defining 
a list of areas in which the Council, subject to_certain conditions regarding 
a quorum, would retain the final say (governmental area, executive or rule-
making areas) and also of the areas in which the Assembly, again subject to 
certain conditions regarding a quorum, would have the last word (parliament-
ary area). 
After considering the matter at length, the Committee on Budgets took the 
view that the European Parliament should have the final say as regards the 
financial implications of any new measures. 
17. These are the two essential points on which Parliament should remain 
firm if it is not to fail in its fundamental mission as representative of the 
peoples of the Community. 
1 doc. COM 1000, p. 4. 
- 13 - PE 33.515/fin. 
III. OTHER RESERVATIONS 
18. Other reservations still remain: 
In the first place, the Commission's terminology requires clarificat-
ion on a large number of points if disillusion and conflicts are to be 
avoided. 
The texts in fact embody a great number of new expressions whose 
meaning should be precisely defined. 
In particular it is frequently stated that certain provisions will be 
adopted in agreement with the Parliament or in agreement with the Council. 
Does this mean after consultation or after receiving assent? Why has the 
precise expression not been used? 
Similarly what are the meaning and implications of the expression 'on 
a recommendation of'? 
19. Another reservation concerns the procedure proposed for the creation 
of new own resources. 
In 1970 it was proposed that such resources should be adopted by the 
Parliament acting by a qualified majority on a unanimous proposal of the 
Council. 
It is now suggested that this should be done by the Council on a 
proposal from the Commission and in agreement with the Assembly. 
When we consider the result, it seems that in fact nothing has changed. 
On the other hand the symbolic gesture is extremely important in this 
area: it is up to the Parliament to take the final action, the taxes being 
normally decided by the 'representatives of the peoples of the Community'. 
- 0 -
20. In conclusion, a first examination of these proposals shows that the 
Commission has tried to give new satisfaction to the Parliament essentially 
in the sphere of control (audit office) and in regard to budgetary powers 
where its proposals did not affect the Council (ECSC levy). 
As to the creation of own resources, the Commission has taken over -
in what appears to be a rather heavy-handed manner - the proposals of the 
Rey Commission, while changing the symbolic value for the benefit of the 
Council which has the final say. 
Finally, in regard to budgetary powers as such, the Commission has made 
proposals which do not really change the present inter-institutional balance 
which is generally recognized to be unsatisfactory: the second reading adds 
nothing essential, the power to reject the budget at the end of the procedure 
is apparently abandoned etc •.. 
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21. The Committee on Budgets considers that these proposals cannot be 
favourably received and that the Commission must be asked to submit new 
proposals on all the points referred to in this document. 
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